What type of weapons do you think Iraq now has?
I think there’s a very, very high probability–close to a certainty–that they have regenerated chemical weapons, both mustard and nerve agents, and biological weapons, both toxics and bacteriological weapons. The issue of uncertainty is whether they’ve gone into viral weapons and made substantial progress in nuclear weapons.
Do you think it’s possible to make inspections work?
I think our objective has to be clear and agreed upon. Iraq must believe–Saddam must believe–that if he does not accept an extraordinarily intrusive inspection regime that the alternative will be an invasion and regime change. But he also has to be convinced that if he does accept it, there will not be an invasion and regime change. If the administration is not serious, if their real intent is regime change, then I don’t think inspections are a good idea.
What is needed for the inspections to be effective?
The first thing is no sanctuaries and no-notice inspections: any place, any time without notice. There are no palaces, there are no Islamic holidays, no military locations that are out of bounds. Second, we must know where to go. We would rely on intelligence from concerned states, and on information from defectors and others. So it’s important that inspectors be able to engage in a dialogue that is a two-way street with concerned nations. This is a sensitive and controversial position because there is a lot of thinking that the United Nations can’t do this or oughtn’t to do this. The rejoinder is this is not a normal state. Iraq is a hostile environment and should be dealt with that way. The inspectors will also need to have insurance that while they are inspecting, there is no movement of people, facilities in or out of the area. No-fly and no-drive zones should be established.
Where are these weapons hidden? How are we going to find them?
I think any inspection regime would have to start where the last one left off in 1998. These are facilities that have been inspected and were supposed to be completely shut down, the equipment destroyed or removed. We’d want to make sure there is nothing going on there. But that would be just a start because Iraq would know that would be the first place we would look. We would also be guided by satellite photography, clandestine reporting and defector reports.
Assuming they have created new facilities, how hard will they be to find?
Since Iraq learned a lot about inspection procedures, went through years of trying to hide them while inspectors were looking and now has had four full years to camouflage and hide where they’re going on, this will be very challenging. But remember: the goal is not to do this in a week, but to continue an inspection regime indefinitely, which will ensure sites already identified don’t become reactivated. It will be extremely hard for Iraq to have programs of significance if we have in place a truly intrusive inspection regime.
Why talk of invasion now–why after all this time is it so crucial to go back in there?
The more time that passes, the more you can expect Iraq to have regenerated these weapons programs. And one cannot have confidence that Iraq would not be a nuclear-weapons state in five years. The Al Qaeda attack of 9-11 underlined the willingness of terrorist groups to cause maximum casualties in the United States and also demonstrated a logistical capability, an intelligence capability which we regard and should regard as extraordinary. I don’t know of any good evidence of connections between Iraq and Al Qaeda. But simply hoping Iraq will not transfer weapons to Al Qaeda does not seem to be prudent policy.
Having studied WMD and proliferation for so long, in general are you optimistic about the future?
No, I’m not optimistic that over the next 10 years we will avoid a serious mass-casualty event. The vulnerabilities are quite large, and the responsibility of government to deal with these vulnerabilities are just awesome.
