NEWSWEEK: Why has the Nuclear Suppliers Group not consented to the agreement?
Mark Fitzpatrick: Several members raised questions at the recent NSG meeting about India’s position on not testing nuclear weapons again, India’s willingness to pursue a cap on material production and not using the uranium that it would be presumably buying from the United States under this deal for weapons purposes. The nature of the questions indicated that some members of the NSG had concerns they wanted answered before they were ready to OK the deal. For this deal to be implemented it needs both the consent of the U.S. Congress and all 45 members of the NSG. So even if one member objects, by the rules of the NSG, they cannot agree to the deal.
Which NSG members opposed the deal?
According to widespread reports it is clear that Ireland, Sweden and Austria have been asking serious questions.
What is the main concern?
The concern raised by several experts is whether the uranium that is sold to India would free up India’s own domestic resources of uranium to be put to weapons production. I understand that India’s strategists think that they have enough nuclear weapons now and they wouldn’t need to resort to weapons production. So perhaps this concern can be addressed somehow.
Under the terms of the deal with the United States, India agreed to join the fissile-material cutoff treaty [which would ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons], if it got off the ground. I think it would be useful for both the United States and India to take a leadership in Geneva to promote that treaty.
Will the new Democratic Congress overturn this deal?
Even though I think the deal is very much alive, it might not be approved as rapidly as it might have been if the Republicans had retained control of Congress. There is a greater interest among the Democrats in nonproliferation objectives. It is conceivable that they would want to see some other changes in U.S. nonproliferation policy before they went along with the India deal. Besides, having been away from the leadership of the House for 12 years, the Democrats have many pent-up issues that they would like to [bring to the] table. So where they would put the U.S.-India nuclear deal among their other priorities is unknown.
What could break the deal?
After the North Korean test, the concern about nuclear testing in the United States is going to be pretty high, and the deal would be off if India was to test nuclear weapons again. It is possible that India may see this as a U.S. infringement, and India may just walk away if Congress did have such a condition.
If the deal goes through, would it undermine nonproliferation efforts?
There’s a perception that the Unites States was not really serious in its previous opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology and that America has double standards. This kind of impression will not change decisions in Tehran or Pyongyang about their own weapons programs, but it will have an impact in the thinking of other nations in the future, who might consider pursuing nuclear weapons on their own. So I think overall, it does weaken the nonproliferation regime.
Would there be any checks on India’s proliferation?
The U.S. deal under which India agreed to put 14 of its nuclear facilities under IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] inspection is not really a nonproliferation benefit because if India is using other facilities to produce nuclear weapons, inspecting just those 14 plants has no logical gain for nonproliferation. The requirement to have inspections is more to do with the perception of India undertaking responsibilities required by many other states. However, India as a condition to this deal has revised its export-control laws to bring them into conformity with the international standards. So there should be no doubt about India’s ability and willingness to control its nuclear technology.
Would it fuel an arms race?
If Pakistan perceives that India is increasing its weapon stockpile, it will feel the need to produce nuclear weapons of its own, and a slow arms race will continue, and the more weapons are produced the more plutonium–highly enriched uranium–is produced, the more there is a danger that weapons can get in the wrong hands. When other countries see that India and Pakistan continue to build nuclear weapons, it contributes to an atmosphere [where] nuclear weapons are attractive and desirable. Of course, the U.S.A. still has nuclear weapons along with four other acknowledged nuclear-weapon states, so I wouldn’t put the entire onus on South Asia to stop the arms race, but these are the only countries besides North Korea now who are continuing to expand their stockpiles. Israel is uncertain.
Why is the United States bending over backward to accommodate India?
The nuclear deal was originally characterized by U.S. administration officials as part of a strategic relationship with India as a bulwark against China, but this kind of characterization was soon dropped because it didn’t play well in India. The U.S.-India relationship was important in its own right. This deal was done to reinforce the growing strategic relationship between the two countries. The United States believes that India is a strong, reliable and responsible partner and that after all these years it is time to get over what might be called a “historic accident.” The doors of the nuclear-weapons club happened to close after China was a member and before India knocked on the door. The Bush administration is trying to break the Gordian knot and start afresh and welcome India into the club.
